Recently, Cheng et al. proposed a novel biometric-based remote user authentication scheme using quadratic residues. Cheng et al. claimed that their proposed scheme is secure, practical, and trustworthy remote authentication, which can be implemented on different real network environments. However, this paper points out that Cheng et al.'s scheme not only suffers from stolen smart card attack and server spoofing attack, but also does not provide forward secrecy.
Introduction
Remote user authentication scheme using smart cards allow remote users to communicate securely over public networks simply by using easy-to-remember passwords and smart cards for the client-server architecture [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . To provide strong security, the remote user authentication scheme adopts people's biometrics information (e.g. fingerprints, faces, iris scan, voice print, hand geometry, and palm-prints) for convincing users' identities [4, 5, 6, 7] . Generally, the biometric technology has three main advantages as follows [7] :
1. The personal biometric information is extremely hard to make duplicate or share biometrics.
2. The personal biometric information is extremely hard to forge or distribute.
3. The personal biometric information cannot lost or forgotten and cannot be guessed easily.
In 2013, Cheng et al. [7] proposed a novel biometric based remote user authentication scheme which is based on the quadratic residues and biometric verification to achieve efficient and security requirements. Through the security analysis, Cheng et al. claimed that their proposed scheme is secure, practical, and trustworthy remote authentication, which can be implemented on different real network environments. However, this paper points out that Cheng et al.'s scheme not only suffers from stolen smart card attack and server spoofing attack, but also does not provide forward secrecy.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the Cheng et al.'s scheme. The security flaws of Cheng et al.'s scheme are shown in Section 3. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 4.
Review of Cheng et al.'s Scheme
This section briefly reviews Cheng et al.'s scheme [7] . The Cheng et al.'s scheme consists of three phases: registration phase, login phase, authentication phase.
Notations
We outlined some notations used in this research paper.
• U : the remote user R1. In the beginning, the user U sends his/her identity ID and the related biometrics B to the registration center R over a secure channel.
R2. After receiving the message {ID, B}, the registration center R computes f = B ⊕ r, and A = x ⊕ f ⊕ ID, where r is a random number unique to R. And then, R stores the data {f, A, ID, r, h(·)} into a smart card and issues it to U . L1. The user U inserts his/her smart card into the card reader, and inputs his/her identity ID and the personal biometrics B.
L2. The smart card checks f ⊕ r ? = B to verify the user U 's biometrics on the specific device. If it holds, U passes the biometrics verification; otherwise, the scheme is aborted.
L3. The user U randomly selects a number t to compute D = h(A⊕f ⊕ID⊕t), T = t 2 mod n, and M = h(t).
L4. The user U forwards the message {D, T, M } to the server S.
Authentication phase
After receiving the login message from the user U , both the server S and the user U perform the following steps to achieve mutual authentication.
A1. The server S utilizes the Chinese Remainder Theorem [7] to solve T = t 2 mod n, since S can derive four roots (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) with two large primes p and q.
A2. The server S compares h(t i ) with the received M , for i = 1 to 4, so that it can obtain the correct value of t.
A3. The server S checks
If it holds, S believes the validity of U ; otherwise, S rejects the user's login request.
A4. The server S computes E = h(x ⊕ t) ⊕ s and N = h(h(x ⊕ t)||s), where s is a random number selected by the server S, and S forwards the message {E, N } to U .
A5. After receiving the message, the user U computes s = D ⊕ E.
A6. The user U checks N ?
= h(D||s ) = h(h(x ⊕ t)||s ) by using the derived s . If it holds, the user believes the trustworthy of S.
After finishing the mutual authentication, both the user and the server compute the common session key sk = h(D||s ||r) = h(h(x ⊕ t)||s||r) for their subsequent communication.
Cryptanalysis of Cheng et al.'s Scheme
This section demonstrates that Cheng et al.'s scheme not only suffers from stolen smart card attack and server spoofing attack, but also does not provide forward secrecy.
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Common session key sk = h(D||s ||r) = h(h(x ⊕ t)||s||r) 
Stolen smart card attack
Suppose that an attacker Eve obtained a legal user's smart card. We know that the smart card has the data {f, A, ID, r, h(·)} for the user U . Then, the attacker Eve can perform the following stolen smart card attack.
1. Extract the biometrics B by computing f ⊕r. Because f ⊕r = B⊕r⊕r = B, Eve can easily obtain B.
2. Extract the secret key x of the server S by computing f ⊕ A ⊕ ID. Because f ⊕ A ⊕ ID = f ⊕ x ⊕ f ⊕ ID ⊕ ID = x, Eve can easily obtain the secret key x.
By using B and x, the attacker Eve can freely perform the user impersonation attack or the server impersonation attack. Therefore, Cheng et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to the above stolen smart card attack.
